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In the fall of 2009, an editorial in the British The Guardian dis-
cussed the new supreme court for the United Kingdom.1  The editorial
emphasized, “The new court is not like others of the same name
around the world.  It has no power to nullify acts of parliament as
unconstitutional.”2  It concluded, “This is a good day for grown-up
government.”3
On this side of the Atlantic, “grown-up government” means a Su-
preme Court with the power to nullify legislative acts as unconstitu-
tional.  Nevertheless, over two centuries after the Anglo-American
legal tradition diverged into a British and an American path, a su-
* Professor and Michael and Helen Lee Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law
School.  The author would like to thank Alfred Brophy, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Maeva Marcus
for helpful comments on this Essay; the other participants at the conference; and Andrew
Golden for research assistance.  The footnotes in this Essay are not intended to be comprehen-
sive.  Readers interested in the topic in greater depth are advised to consult the two books that
were the focus of this symposium: PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008), and
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
1 Editorial, Supreme Court: Britain’s October Revolution, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 1,
2009, at 34. See generally Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.) (establishing Britain’s
supreme court); Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (Commencement No. 11) Order 2009, No.
1604, c. 83 (putting the supreme court provisions of the Constitutional Reform Act into effect on
October 1, 2009).
2 Editorial, supra note 1, at 34.
3 Id.
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preme court and judicial review do not necessarily go together.  This
divergence suggests that what judges are supposed to do—in particu-
lar, what supreme court judges are supposed to do when confronted
by legislation that goes against a constitution—is historically
contingent.
The history of what judges are supposed to do is the subject of
Philip Hamburger’s impressive new book Law and Judicial Duty.4
Hamburger begins by emphasizing that judicial review “often seems
the central feature of American constitutional law.”5  He then asks,
“Where does this power come from?  And what is its character and
scope?”6  Hamburger argues in the following 600-plus pages that the
common law ideals of law and judicial duty together “required judges
to hold unconstitutional acts unlawful.”7  In short, a hierarchical con-
ception of law and an oath to decide in “accord with the law of the
land” meant that judges had no choice but to conduct judicial review.8
Hamburger’s emphasis on the judicial perspective on constraint
makes an important contribution to scholarship seeking to reconsider
the myth of Marbury v. Madison.9  Part I of this Essay discusses the
difficulties facing any account of the history of judicial review.  Part II
considers three aspects of Hamburger’s account: his reliance on the
concept of duty, his use of a singular conception of the law, and his
acknowledgment of an alternative concept, “expounding the law.”
I. Difficulties Confronting Judicial Review Histories
For any scholar, to write on the history of judicial review is to
enter a field already brimming with accounts.  One of the wonderful,
albeit daunting, aspects of electronic databases and Google is that
they offer the ability to recover an increasing number of things written
long ago on a subject.  If one combines scholarship and commentary
over the last two centuries on judicial review with the contemporary
outpouring in law, history, and political science, there is an enormous
amount written.  Quite frankly, a mere mortal law professor is un-
likely to be able to keep up with it all.  Increasingly, many scholars
will probably find themselves partway into writing a new article only
to discover that someone a century ago already wrote a shorter, less
heavily footnoted version.
4 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 17.
8 Id. at 18.
9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Other difficulties confront the inquiry into why the American sys-
tem favors judicial review.  In exploring this area over the past dec-
ade, I have concluded that at least four significant problems exist:
disciplinary divisions, terminology, comparisons, and precedents.
Disciplinary divisions abound.  Law professors, political scien-
tists, and historians are interested in different angles.10  Not surpris-
ingly, their paths of analysis lead to what appear to be divergent
conclusions.11  Legal scholars worry about constitutional doctrines and
institutions such as courts.12  Political scientists worry about principles
of political science such as separation of powers.13  Finally, historians
worry about cultural and political practices and ideas such as constitu-
tionalism.14  Rather than being mutually exclusive, these approaches
often describe different facets or strands of the same general phenom-
enon.  What is everyone talking about?
In fact, although most modern scholars employ the term judicial
review, it is itself historically contingent.  Edward Corwin first used
the phrase in 1909.15  Before that, in the nineteenth century, writers
favored judicial duty or judicial power.16  Courts, however, usually just
described setting aside or voiding acts repugnant to the constitution.17
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s recent use of repugnancy language was a
refreshing return to a past practice18: “We find this to be repugnant to
the Constitution, and a painful reminder of some of the most ignomin-
ious chapters of our national history.”19  Given the number of differ-
ent labels, which one should be used?
10 See Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief Historiography of Judicial Review, 20 J.
POL’Y HIST. 6, 8 (2008).
11 Id.
12 See id. at 8–10 (discussing Horace Gray, who stressed the continuity between “the cur-
rent Supreme Judicial Court and its colonial predecessor”).
13 See id. at 10–12 (describing political scientists’ depiction of judicial review as an original
doctrine grounded in American federalism).
14 See id. at 12–13 (discussing historians’ placement of judicial review in the context of
American colonialism).
15 Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L.
REV. 643, 660, 670 (1909); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,
116 YALE L.J. 502, 505 n.5 (2006) (discussing Corwin’s development of the term judicial review).
16 See Bilder, supra note 15.
17 Bilder, supra note 10, at 7.
18 This is especially true if one has argued that judicial review grows out of the colonial
experience of an imperial constitution founded on the notion of repugnancy. See, e.g., MARY
SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
EMPIRE 10–11 (2004); Bilder, supra note 15, at 508, 543 & n.219.
19 al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the use of the federal
material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists violated the Constitution); see also Drake
v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 240 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Since at least 1935, it has been the established
1132 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:1129
A related concern is how to choose the appropriate pre- and post-
1787 comparison.  Discontinuities between the two periods include: a
mixed imperial government versus a tripartite national government; a
Privy Council versus a Supreme Court; colonies versus states; and the
laws of England versus a written Constitution, to name just a few.20
The periods, however, also share continuities.  Both embrace repug-
nancy language; the office of the judge; some power to negate legisla-
tion; some notion, however amorphous, of fundamental law; and some
idea of constitutionalism.21  What is the appropriate transformation?22
Lastly, this complexity means that accounts often get bogged
down in a search for precedents, particularly during the transitional
years of the 1780s.  The line of state cases related to judicial review
has remained relatively constant (plus or minus one or two) since the
mid-nineteenth century.23  In 1865, Horace Gray (later a Supreme
Court Justice) penned an influential footnote listing some of these
cases.24  Two decades later, William Meigs wrote an influential article
discussing them.25  Nearly a century later, Gordon Wood’s important
law of the United States that a conviction obtained through testimony the prosecutor knows to
be false is repugnant to the Constitution.”).
20 See Mary Sarah Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in TRANS-
FORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J.
HORWITZ 28, 29 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009) [hereinafter Bilder, Colo-
nial Constitutionalism] (discussing the shift from England’s “[a]ssemblage of [l]aws” to
America’s written Constitution).  For further discussion of some of these aspects, see Mary Sa-
rah Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 63, 64, 83–103 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Bilder, English Settlement] (describing the institutional development of America’s pre-Revolu-
tionary colonial governance structure, including the role of the Privy Council and the imperial
Constitution).
21 For elaboration on some of these aspects, see Bilder, English Settlement, supra note 20,
at 88–103 (discussing the pre-1787 court system and colonial law).
22 For an account on the transformation of constitutional law, see generally Bilder, Colo-
nial Constitutionalism, supra note 20.
23 Some of the most prominent cases include the Ten-Pound Act Cases (N.H. 1786), de-
scribed in 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 968–71 (1953); Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor’s Ct. 1784),
reprinted in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY
392–419 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 5 (1787); Trevett v.
Weeden (R.I. 1786), described in JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN
(Providence, John Carter 1787); and Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
24 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772
app. 1, at 529 n.32 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865) (appendix written by Horace Gray, Jr.).
25 William M. Meigs, The Relation of the Judiciary to the Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175,
178–83 (1885).
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The Creation of the American Republic brought renewed interest to
the line.26
How should authors write about this relatively well-known list of
cases?  American law professors are not English Tudor-Stuart histori-
ans who can reference the Five Knights Case27 or the Ship Money
Case28 and then simply explain what they are adding to the topic.
Publishers and law review editors, wary of those readers unfamiliar
with the subject, often want explanations as if the cases had just been
discovered.  Articles are also metrics for proving to the relevant au-
thorities that one is accomplishing something.29  More substantively,
many authors process information by writing; because these cases are
sufficiently complicated, writing one’s own account is understandable.
And, to be sure, I too have failed to cut such work product from past
published works, realizing only in retrospect that the cases could have
been deleted.  Nonetheless, future histories of judicial review might
try to avoid devoting so many printed pages to in-depth re-recounting
of the facts of known cases.  How then should authors deal with the
precedents?
Hamburger takes an unusual and intriguing approach.  He titles
the section of these cases “Four Sets of Cases (with a Choice for the
Reader).”30  He suggests that “[r]ather than read the entire remainder
of this chapter, the reader may wish to select a state—New Jersey,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or North Carolina—and read about
its case or cases.”31  As he explains, “[a]ny one of them . . . will suffice
to illustrate how judges held statutes unconstitutional, and the reader
should therefore feel free to read about any one state and then pro-
ceed to the next chapter.”32  Not all publishers may be so accommo-
dating, but for authors with publishing clout, this presents an
interesting possibility.
Readers would benefit from perusing Hamburger’s account of
the New Jersey precedent Holmes v. Walton.33  Although several
26 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 453–63
(1969) (section entitled “The Enhancement of the Judiciary”).
27 Darnel’s Case (The Five Knights’ Case), (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B.).
28 Ship Money Case, (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825.
29 See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 44 (1936).
30 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 406.
31 Id. at 407.
32 Id.
33 Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780), described in Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New
Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1899).  For Hamburger’s discussion, see HAMBURGER,
supra note 4, at 407–22.  Materials from the case are available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/hw/.
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scholars had written new accounts of the 1780s precedents using dis-
covered archival materials,34 Holmes had remained understudied.
Hamburger’s footnotes demonstrate his wide-ranging and careful ar-
chival research of this overlooked, yet important, case.35
More provocative than Hamburger’s discussion of the traditional
precedents is his chapter discussing less traditional cases.36  For exam-
ple, Hamburger includes a discussion of the Quock Walker cases.37  In
the final Quock Walker case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held slavery unconstitutional under the 1780 state constitu-
tion.38  The underlying cases and facts are fascinating.  The cases are
likely a standard part of many American Legal History course materi-
als to demonstrate pre-1787 ideas of constitutionalism.39  They may
have been traditionally omitted from the judicial review precedent
line because there was no positive legislative enactment permitting
slavery,40 and most scholars focus on the modern institutional conflict
between courts and legislatures.  The decision did not strike down a
34 For an account of the New Hampshire Ten-Pound Act Cases (N.H. 1786), described in 2
CROSSKEY, supra note 23, at 968–71, see Richard M. Lambert, The “Ten Pound Act” Cases and
the Origins of Judicial Review in New Hampshire, 43 N.H. B.J. 37 (2002).  For Rutgers v. Wad-
dington (N.Y. City Mayor’s Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 23, at 392–419, see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH,
CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 194–202 (2005).  For Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), described in
VARNUM, supra note 23, see BILDER, supra note 18, at 188–91.  For Commonwealth v. Caton, 8
Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782), see William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of
Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
35 In addition to Holmes, those interested in the judicial review precedents might focus on
the Josiah Philips Case (Va. Gen. Ct. 1778), discussed in 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES app. note D, at 293 (Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) (Hamburger chose not to
include this Philips).  I am aware of only two accounts of this bill of attainder case, both over a
century old. See W. P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 444 (1896); William
Romaine Tyree, The Case of Josiah Philips, 16 VA. L. REG. 648 (1911); see also Treanor, supra
note 34, at 538 n.212.  Who knows whether there is anything new to be written, but it would
seem to represent one of the earliest possible post-1776 confrontations of the problem.
36 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 476–503 (chapter entitled “Not Holding Legislative Acts
Unconstitutional”).
37 Id. at 476–84 (discussing the series of unpublished Massachusetts decisions concerning
the slave Quock Walker).  For prior discussions of the cases, see the sources listed in
HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 477 n.1.  Horace Gray wrote the leading scholarship on the cases.
See 13 PROC. OF THE MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 292–99 (Boston, Mass. Hist. Soc’y 1874).  Gray had
written the footnote suggesting cases in which judges had exercised judicial duty. See supra note
24 and accompanying text.  For a brief discussion of Gray’s role in promoting judicial review on
the Supreme Court, see Bilder, supra note 10, at 10.
38 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 482–84.
39 See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, American Legal History Course Reader pt. 1 (Fall 2009)
(unpublished course pack, on file with author).
40 See HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 479.
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legislative act but rather barred slavery as a customary practice or as a
part of colonial common law.41
By including this case, Hamburger makes the crucial point that
the lens through which judicial review cases have been investigated is
too narrow.  What if the history of judicial review was not regarded
simply as legislative acts voided by a supreme court, but as practices
found unconstitutional by a court?  In fact, what if scholars stopped
being so fretful about judicial review and thought more broadly about
early American practices of constitutionalism?
Implicit in much contemporary scholarship is the emphasis that
judicial review is not constitutionalism.42  The “Chronological Table of
State Decisions” at the end of Hamburger’s book, however, contains
sufficient unfamiliar names to suggest that more work can be done to
discern the outer boundaries of state constitutionalism in the 1780s.43
Daniel Hulsebosch’s work on the conflict between the Treaty of 1783
and state law suggests another less familiar boundary.44  If the shifting
boundaries of early American constitutionalism are better under-
stood, the smaller strand of judicial review might be disentangled.
In this sense, perhaps the most important contribution of
Hamburger’s book is to remind readers of the wider horizons of the
fundamental inquiry.  Three concepts raised by Hamburger’s account
offer opportunities for further exploration.
II. Exploring Law and Judicial Duty
A. The Language of Duty
Hamburger focuses on judges—and this lens on the judge is rela-
tively new.  This approach recalls the late John P. Dawson’s work on
the changing conception of the judge.45  To compare the two is to em-
41 Id. at 482–84.
42 See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(2009) (discussing the relationship between judicial review and the will of the people); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004) (rejecting the modern understanding that popular sovereignty is inapposite to judicial
review); John Phillip Reid, Another Origin of Judicial Review: The Constitutional Crisis of 1776
and the Need for a Dernier Judge, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963 (1989) (arguing that judicial review
emerged as a means to curb the abuse of a sovereign legislature).
43 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 655–58.
44 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic
World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 843–58 (2006) (discussing
cases invalidating antiloyalist legislation that interfered with the Peace Treaty of 1783).
45 JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).
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phasize the degree to which the judge—as opposed to the judiciary—
has been long understudied in the history of judicial review.
I agree with Hamburger that there is some notion, inherent in the
office of the judge, that what judges did was decide cases and, in the
course of deciding cases, they might on occasion have to limit legisla-
tion and more broadly limit law.  Reading backwards through his
book, I was fascinated by the repetitive trope of a judicial duty.  This
language, of course, appears in the account by Horace Gray, one of
the first to try to describe the history of judicial review and an impor-
tant participant in the consolidation of the Supreme Court’s judicial
review power after the Civil War.46  Hamburger traces duty back
through Federalist No. 7847 and James Iredell’s oft-discussed August
1786 editorial,48 back through the state cases of the 1780s,49 and even
back to the very beginning of the seventeenth century with Sir Francis
Bacon.50
Nonetheless, although the office of the judge was understood to
involve, potentially, the requirement that some type of legislation be
limited, it is not clear that duty was always or necessarily the language
in which this aspect of the office was described.  Not having read any-
thing close to what Hamburger has on the English side, I can only
raise a question.  The fact that the office was sometimes described us-
ing the term duty does not mean it necessarily had to involve duty.
Indeed, what does duty mean and how did the term change over time?
Even if one accepted that duty was the essential and static con-
cept, questions remain about the relationship between duty and God.
To put it differently, does duty need to be, or to remain, divinely de-
rived?  At the time of the Constitution, duty was an important word,
but one that seems to have shifted to a republican notion rather than a
religious notion.  In some sense, the people or the constitution replace
46 Bilder, supra note 15 (discussing Horace Gray’s role in the development of the concept
of judicial duty); see also Bilder, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing Gray’s influence in promoting
judicial review on the Supreme Court).
47 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 552–54 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
48 Id. at 464 (“‘The duty of the [judicial] Power I conceive, in all cases, is to decide accord-
ing to the Laws of the State’” (quoting An Elector [James Iredell], To the Public (Aug. 1786)));
see also id. at 473 (“‘[A]ny Act inconsistent with the Constitution was void; [a]nd . . . the Judges,
consistently with their duties, could not carry it into effect.’” (quoting Letter from James Iredell
to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 307 (Donna
Kelly & Lang Baradell eds., 2003))).
49 Id. at 406–61.
50 Id. at 197.
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God, the Pope, or the crown/king.51  The importance of duty is that it
appears to remove individual choice—one can see how that concept
becomes important as ideas about judges exercising will come into in-
creasing focus.52  Over the last thousand years, the authority/authori-
ties that people perceive to govern their lives have shifted—indeed,
the early parts of Hamburger’s book seem to engage in a fascinating
conversation with an older body of English legal history about the
origins of fundamental law and authority.53  But does who or what
gives judges the authority to limit legislation matter so long as those
judges see judicial review as part of a cultural practice of what they
do?
B. Multiple Authorities
Hamburger takes seriously the underlying logic, philosophy, and
theory of judging and authority.  Repeatedly, he imagines a hierarchy
from a single authority (God) or a single source of law (the “law of
the land”—note the singular law).54  The mono-authority approach is
coherent, logical, and perhaps even modern.
Early modern England, however, was a world of multiple authori-
ties.  Mixed government with overlapping authorities dominated the
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century world.  One of the interesting as-
pects of recent legal history on Tudor-Stuart England and colonial
America is the importance of the idea of authorities in terms of ideas
about franchises and liberties.  Paul Halliday’s recent work on habeas
and Daniel Hulsebosch’s work on imperial constitutions emphasize
overlapping authorities and the plurality of jurisdictions.55
51 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“[I]t is quite striking, and certainly no accident, that . . . the U.S. Constitution
made no reference whatsoever to God and cited as its primary source of authority not ‘the word
of God,’ but ‘We the People.’” (citation omitted)); see also Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protec-
tion, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1850 (2009) (“[Americans] increasingly preferred to think of
themselves as citizens who created their government rather than as subjects of their ruler . . . .”).
For a related argument that the American understanding of appeal has its origins in a much
older conception of a hierarchy of authority, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in
America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913 (1997).
52 See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 6–8 (1975) (discussing the tension between duty and morality in the role of the antislav-
ery judge).
53 See, e.g., J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(1955); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed.
1977) (1940); J. W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CONCEP-
TIONS (2000).
54 E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 18.
55 See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 140–47 (2010)
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Although I have attempted no statistical analysis, my impression
is that the phrase Hamburger favors, law of the land, is not as domi-
nant as laws of England during this period.  Edward Coke calls his
work Institutes of the Lawes of England.56  Thomas Wood uses the title
An Institute of the Laws of England.57  Even as late as William Black-
stone, the plural sense of laws appears in Commentaries on the Laws
of England.58  A rich, plural, and diverse body of English laws
emerges, rather than a knowable, singular English law.59  What ap-
pears at first like a slight semantic shift by Hamburger to a singular
notion of law may be essential to constrain judicial duty, but the shift
seems hard to align with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-
American legal culture.
Perhaps the conventional account has posited too abrupt a transi-
tion to mono-authorities (such as the Constitution and “the people”)
and separation of powers.  Because the rhetoric of separation of pow-
ers appears dramatically in the 1770s and 1780s, the temptation is to
construct it as a foundational political science or to assume that peo-
ple thought about it the way that we do.  To illustrate, even Gordon
Wood originally suggested that the separation of powers model had
firmly developed by the mid-1780s and predated the Constitution.60
(describing “laws of the lands”); HULSEBOSCH, supra note 34 (tracing the multiple authorities
that informed New York’s constitutional history); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The
Multiple Constitutions of Empire in New York, 1750–1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319 (1998)
(discussing the same).
56 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
(photo. reprint 1979) (1628).
57 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (London, Nutt & Gosling
1720).
58 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (photo. reprint
1979) (1765).
59 See Bilder, English Settlement, supra note 20, at 96–103 (discussing the difficulty of ap-
plying the diverse laws of England to the American colonies).
60 See Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the People Themselves and Popular Consti-
tutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 820 (2006) (“Gordon Wood . . . highlighted the shift on
the eve of the constitutional convention to a theory of popular sovereignty,” which became the
basis for “an agency theory of separation of powers.”).  Some years ago now, Morton Horwitz
asked me about Gordon Wood’s 1969 account of separation of powers. WOOD, supra note 26, at
608 (“The separation of this governmental power, rather than simply the participation of the
people in a part of the government, became the best defense of liberty.”).  Horwitz asked about
Wood’s suggestion that the separation of powers model was fully developed prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution.  I have puzzled over that question ever since.  Indeed, Gordon Wood’s
latest book seems to describe a more gradual shift towards separation of powers and the inde-
pendent judiciary. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 400–32 (2009).
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One of my favorite moments in James Madison’s final version of
his notes of the Philadelphia Convention occurs during his effort to
save the Council of Revision (the idea that judges and the Executive
would ex ante review laws for constitutionality).61  Madison wrote that
he “could not discover in the proposed association of the Judges with
the Executive in the Revisionary check on the Legislature any viola-
tion of the maxim which requires the great departments of power to
be kept separate & distinct.”62  Nowadays, the Council of Revision
seems a perfect example of a violation of separation of powers.  The
fact that Madison could write so explicitly to the contrary hints that a
modern understanding of separation of powers and his understanding
might be different.
Although people wrote about three parts of government and sep-
aration of powers as a maxim (to use Madison’s word) on the ground
in the colonies, there had been two powers (executive and legislative)
and two branches (governors and legislatures).63  Judges were ap-
pointed by or were the same as either the executive or legislative au-
thority.64  There was a functional third branch for the colonists—the
Privy Council—but that does not fit into a modern separation of pow-
ers model at all.65  There were two obvious governmental functions:
making laws and executing laws.66
Conceptualizing the judiciary as an independent third branch was
tricky.  Obviously, the first effort at a constitution—the Articles of
Confederation—included no such separate institution.67  The early
state constitutions only gradually began to group together judicial
functions in a third “branch.”68  The early history of the Supreme
61 James Madison, Notes from the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (July 21, 1787), in 3
DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 390, 390–403 (1900).
62 Id. at 395.
63 Bilder, English Settlement, supra note 20, at 65.
64 See id.
65 Id.
66 See Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 368, 387 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983)
(stating that “there is no more than two powers in any government . . . for the judicial power is
only a branch of the executive”).
67 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1777), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITO-
RIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9, 12
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2002) (1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (“The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last
resort on appeal.”).
68 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
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Court suggests a struggle between the Court and other branches to
understand the meaning of separation of powers with respect to the
judiciary.  Recall the Supreme Court in the 1790s.  Can it give advi-
sory opinions?69  Can it decide pension disputes?70  The answers (both
no) seem straightforward to the modern observer, but the fact that the
questions were posed suggests again that the meaning of separation of
powers for the judiciary was not always so clear.
C. Expounding the Law
Expanding Hamburger’s important investigation about judicial
duty into a larger inquiry about how judges thought about what they
were supposed to do would reveal that much remains unclear about
how late eighteenth-century American judges culturally constructed
their roles.71  What did they think they were doing?  Equally impor-
tant, regardless of what they thought they were doing, what were they
actually doing?  Perhaps someone should write a book like G. Edward
White’s The American Judicial Tradition that concludes with John
Marshall.72
An exploration of the judicial tradition that began in England
and ended in the United States should focus on the word expound.
Hamburger notices the importance of the word.  He repeatedly refer-
ences exposition of law and titles chapter 7 “Authority to Expound
Law.”73  Chapter 7 even begins with a glimpse of the complexity of
expound.74  In contrasting the early seventeenth-century common law-
yers and the Roman law tradition, Hamburger notes that “[f]rom [the]
imperial perspective, much of what common lawyers would consider
the exposition of law was actually lawmaking.”75  This tension be-
TIONS, supra note 67, at 1827, 1905–06 (original text of 1780 amended in part in 1918 (art. I) and
in 1964 (art. II)).
69 See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES
144, 149–70 (1997) (discussing the 1793 debate over advisory opinions between the Washington
Administration and the Court).
70 See Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE “EX-
TENDED REPUBLIC”: THE FEDERALIST ERA 25, 36–41 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds.,
1996) (discussing the interplay between the judiciary, the Washington Administration, and Con-
gress in the pension dispute known as Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
71 See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1974); A. G.
ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL
CULTURE, 1680–1810 (1981).
72 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 24 (expanded ed. 1988).
73 HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 218.
74 Id. at 218–25.
75 Id. at 220.
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tween expounding the law and lawmaking, between how judges saw
their tradition and how others did, is at the center of the judicial re-
view difficulty.
Yet, this glimpse of differing perspectives slips away.  Rather than
continue to explore the thickness or richness of expound, Hamburger
veers away towards repeating the word as a part of judicial duty.76  He
writes, for example:
The exposition of law traditionally belonged to the office of
judgment rather than that of will or force, and such exposi-
tion seemed necessary for the judges in the exercise of their
office if they not only had to understand or interpret the law
but also had to explain what it was.  At least therefore in
their cases, the judges were understood to expound the law,
including constitutions, with the authority of their office.77
What did it mean to expound the law?  Courts do not use the
word too frequently anymore.78  In the Oxford English Dictionary, it
has a number of meanings, but the one associated as “chiefly in Law”
states “[t]o give a particular interpretation to; to construe in a speci-
fied manner.”79  The etymology includes “to put out, set forth, ex-
plain.”80  In early law books, statutes, cases, and precedents were
often expounded.81  The word also occupies a crucial place in Marbury
v. Madison82: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to partic-
ular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation
of each.”83
To expound law suggests interpretation from a particular
source—interpretation the way judges do it or the way a judicial tradi-
tion understands it.84  Expounding is interpretation that in some
76 Id. at 543–48, 614–15.
77 Id. at 543.
78 My cursory and imprecise Lexis search hinted that perhaps by the 1890s, the word had
largely fallen out of use as a way to describe what courts and judges do.  A more precise search
would establish clearer trends.
79 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 581 (2d ed. 1989).
80 Id.
81 For example, when “expound*” is entered into the Eighteenth Century Collections On-
line database, it finds over 1500 works (including many reprints and subsequent editions) in the
“Law” category.  Again, a precise search would provide more specific results.
82 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83 Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
84 See Raoul Berger, New Theories of “Interpretation”: The Activist Flight from the Consti-
tution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8–9 (1986) [hereinafter Berger, New Theories] (equating “ex-
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instances involves something that the interpreting/making law dichot-
omy does not capture.  What happens is that expounding as a judicial
practice gets squished and delegitimized as a rigid separation of pow-
ers model suggests that expounding cannot include anything that
looks like making laws.85
Conclusion
Beginning in 2003 with Marbury’s bicentennial, the meaning of
the case began to be turned on its head.  Almost all the recent work
on Marbury suggests that it was not a big deal with respect to the final
judicial review discussion.86  Wood recently noted that “few in 1803
saw [Marbury’s] far-reaching implications.”87  As has received in-
creased attention, Chief Justice Chase had suggested widespread uni-
formity of belief on the power of the Court earlier in Cooper v.
Telfair.88
If we see this period as struggling with the implications of an in-
creasingly rigid and reified idea of separation of powers, Marshall’s
discussion in Marbury could be positioned nearer to the end of the
story.  The colonial period and early English tradition would contrib-
ute at least three practices: first, a judicial practice of limiting legisla-
tion (and other types of law) based on hierarchical conflict (as
discussed in Hamburger) and a judicial practice of expounding law;
second, a constitutional practice of limiting colonial legislation and
law based on colonial conflicts with the laws of England; and third, a
pounding” with “interpreting” and “interpreting” with plainly not “making law”); see also
RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 49–56 (1969) (cataloging the 1787 Conven-
tion delegates’ discussions about expounding and expositors).
85 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 42 (1914) (arguing that
the Framers’ rejection of the Council of Revision was based upon their desire to keep making
law distinct from expounding law); see also Berger, New Theories, supra note 84.
86 For a few recent examples, see generally LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, THE ACTIVIST: JOHN
MARSHALL, MARBURY V. MADISON, AND THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2008) (analyzing
Marbury using a textualist approach to discern whether the Court established judicial doctrine or
exercised political will); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2706 (2003) (dispelling the myth that Marbury stands for judicial supremacy); Jack N.
Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061 (2007) (discuss-
ing the multiple origins of judicial independence); Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial
Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 262 (2008) (stating that “Marbury did not
found judicial review because the practice was well established before the case was decided”);
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV 455 (2005) (arguing
that judicial review was a common practice before Marbury).
87 WOOD, supra note 60, at 442.
88 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (Chase, C.J.) (“It is, indeed, a general
opinion . . . by all this bar . . . that the Supreme Court can declare an act of congress to be
unconstitutional.”); see also Bilder, supra note 15, at 559–60; Marcus, supra note 70, at 47.
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legislative practice of increasing authority over the making of law
based on ideas of parliamentary supremacy in England and the peo-
ple’s supremacy in America.  In the 1770s and the 1780s, a mantra
arose about separation of powers that seemed to place these practices
in conflict.  And, yet, for a while—indeed, a surprisingly long time—
the theoretical conflicts were seen as avoidable, ignorable, or
deniable.
The advantage of an approach along these lines is that it high-
lights a great mystery about judicial review.  Why does the Supreme
Court appear to go out of the business of deciding controversial hori-
zontal judicial review cases after Marbury?89  Vertical review becomes
more and more comfortable for the Court,90 but horizontal review at
the national level becomes more uncomfortable.91  Mark Graber and
Keith Whittington have recently argued that more judicial review ex-
ists after Marbury than indicated in traditional accounts.92  Yet even
these intriguing articles do not suggest widespread comfort by the Su-
preme Court with opposing Congress on controversial matters prior to
the Civil War.93  In part, the federal focus may be too narrow.  Hori-
zontal review at the state level becomes customary during this time,
and that may help explain the resurgence in review after the Civil
War.94
If there is a holy grail in this field it is coming up with a story
about judicial review that is simple enough and compelling enough to
teach on the first day of Constitutional Law.95  In the old spoof on
89 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW, at I (2000) (observing that “[f]ollowing Marbury, the Supreme Court did not
assert its power of judicial review for another 54 years”).
90 See id. at 79–81 (discussing the ease with which the Court invalidated state legislation in
takings cases).
91 See id. at 82–83 (discussing the tendency of early nineteenth-century courts to leave the
resolution of conflicts to the legislature).
92 Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 177–79, 181 (2007); Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Con-
gress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1258–59 (2009).
93 See Whittington, supra note 92, at 1326–28.
94 See NELSON, supra note 89, at 81–82 (detailing state judicial review cases).
95 See Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won’t Teach Marbury (Except in a Seminar), 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 588 (2004) (describing the shortcomings of using Marbury as an introduction to
constitutional law).  For discourse on the way in which Marbury has been discussed, see, for
example, Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Will Tell
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 982–84 (2009) (reviewing the portrayal of Marbury in various
high school textbooks); Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The
Emergence of a “Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003) (arguing that Marbury did
not become a seminal case until the late nineteenth century, when courts used it to justify the
expansion of judicial power); Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the
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English history, 1066 and All That, the authors point out that history
isn’t what happened, “[i]t is what you can remember.”96  So long as
casebooks and constitutional law professors fall back on teaching that
Marbury invents judicial review, it does not matter that much what
scholars write.97
Hamburger’s insistence that judges always did limit legislation,
however, is still a crucial and important step.  As previously noted,
Hamburger could have placed less reliance on the concept of duty
alone, he could have emphasized the difficulty posed by a plural con-
ception of applicable laws, and he could have explored more deeply
the changing understanding of the idea of expounding the law.  But
his approach goes at least partway towards driving a stake through the
Marbury myth.
Marbury did not invent judicial review.  That feat belonged to
Corwin.98 Marbury—this is Hamburger’s contribution—did not dis-
play judges exercising a new duty.  It did not reveal the Supreme
Court exercising some hitherto unknown power to strike down legisla-
tion against a constitution.  And the exercise of this judicial power was
not even particularly controversial in 1803.  But Marbury is important.
It marks the last time in American history that horizontal judicial re-
view could be seen as quite so uncontroversial.  It may mark the last
moment where a Supreme Court Justice could declare that judicial
review was the simple and seemingly uncontroversial consequence of
expounding the law.
Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1463–64 (2009) (noting that, although Mar-
bury is generally praised as the “fountain head of judicial review,” some scholars have vilified
the decision for being both politicized and undemocratic).
96 WALTER CARRUTHERS SELLAR & ROBERT JULIAN YEATMAN, 1066 AND ALL THAT: A
MEMORABLE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, at vii (1931) (emphasis omitted) (subtitled “Comprising
All the Parts You Can Remember, Including One Hundred and Three Good Things, Five Bad
Kings, and Two Genuine Dates”).
97 Compare ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8–9 (3d ed. 2009) (textbook es-
pousing the view that Marbury creates the authority for judicial review), with GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38–39 (6th ed. 2009) (textbook presenting the view that
judicial review existed before Marbury).
98 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
